FOURTH MEETING OF THE PORTUGUESE SOCIETY FOR ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY



UNIVERSITY OF ÉVORA, 17-19 SEPTEMBER 2009

  1.   HOME

  2.   PROGRAMME

  3.   BOOK OF ABSTRACTS

  4.   REGISTRATION

  5.   TRAVEL

  6.   CONTACT

  7.   LINKS

  8.   PHOTO ALBUM




Conference rooms have projectors for presentations; however, we recommend that you bring your laptop if you speak in the parallel sessions, as we cannot guarantee that all rooms we'll have computers available. If you have handouts, please bring them photocopied already, since it will be difficult to get photocopies done during the conference.




                                        copyright © Sara Bizarro


The fourth meeting of the Portuguese Society for Analytic Philosophy will be held on 17-19 September 2009 at the University of Évora. Besides plenary sessions with invited papers, there will be parallel sessions with submitted papers. Papers should not exceed a 30 minute reading time. Sessions last a maximum of 40 minutes, with discussion.

All submitted abstracts were blind-refereed. Efforts were made to include in the programme quality original papers from different philosophical disciplines.


KEYNOTE SPEAKERS:                            


Kit Fine, New York University, USA

Some Paradoxes of Ground

Abstract: I present some paradoxes of ground and relate them to the semantic paradoxes.


Oswaldo Chateaubriand, PUC do Rio de Janeiro, Brasil

Primary and Secondary Propositions

Abstract: In An Investigation of the Laws of Thought (pp. 52-53) Boole distinguishes primary propositions (“relating to things”) from secondary propositions (“relating to propositions”). This distinction has been generally disregarded in modern logic, with statements about things often phrased as statements about propositions. Thus, negative statements of the form ‘a is not F’ are usually interpreted as ‘it is not the case that a is F’, disjunctive statements of the form ‘a is F or G’ are interpreted as ‘either it is the case that a is F or it is the case that a is G’, and so on. If one assumes that every proposition (statement, sentence) is either true or false, this interpretation does not usually affect truth-value, but it is a misinterpretation that has serious consequences for the analysis of logic and language. In my talk I will take my start from Boole’s distinction, develop it into a general account of predication, and apply it to several issues relating to logical form, truth, conditionality, etc.


Kathrin Glüer-Pagin, Stockholm University, Sweden

Perception and Justification

Abstract: I have defended a belief theory of perceptual experience: Perceptual experience, or so I argue, is best understood as a kind of belief. Such beliefs have what I call phenomenal contents, contents like *that x looks red* or *that it looks as if there was something square in front of me*. Crucially, this allows us to understand experience as providing defeasible inferential reasons for (further) belief. In this talk, I shall look at this account from an epistemological perspective: What is it for experience to provide -- not only reasons, but -- justification for (further) belief?


João Cardoso Rosas, Universidade do Minho, Portugal

How are we to conceive of human rights? A critique of Joseph Raz.

The so-called problems of “the nature of human rights” and of “the foundations of human rights” are closely linked. The way one conceives of the nature of those rights determines whether or not they require further foundations. The traditional view on these matters is foundationalist and it equates human rights with justified basic moral rights. However, a more recent view conceives of human rights as purely functional and as requiring no particular foundations. I look at the most relevant contribution to the latter view – namely, by Jo Raz – in order to show that it fails to produce a sound alternative to the traditional view. Furthermore, I suggest a different path towards a stronger functionalist alternative to the traditional view.


PROGRAMME COMMITTEE


Fernando Ferreira (Universidade de Lisboa)

Teresa Marques (Universidade de Lisboa)

Ricardo Santos (Universidade de Évora)

Pedro Galvão (Universidade de Lisboa)

João Alberto Pinto (Universidade do Porto).


ORGANIZING COMMITTEE


Ricardo Santos (Universidade de Évora)

António Lopes (Centro de Filosofia da Universidade de Lisboa)

Teresa Marques (Centro de Filosofia da Universidade de Lisboa).

ENFA 4 is organized by the Philosophy Department of the University of Évora.


ABOUT REGISTRATION


Reduced rates are provided for students, for everybody registering before 1st August 2009 and for those who do not want to attend the conference dinner. Last minute registration can also be made at the Reception Desk during the conference, in cash – but it should be avoided for organizational reasons and because of serious difficulties in finding accommodation in the city in September. We recommend that you book accomodation as soon as possible, and we suggest you do it through our link for  registration. Évora is classified as a world heritage city by UNESCO, and as such it is visited by many tourists. It is  a small town with a small offer of hotels. Also, there will be four other events taking place at the same time, so accomodation will be difficult to find closer to the date of the conference. Hotels will require payment in advance as a guarantee. We are very sorry if this is an inconvenience for you. Please confirm the reservation conditions on offer at the link for registration. There you can also find the option for flight reservation.


SPONSORS:


























Previous meetings of the Portuguese Society for Analytic Philosophy